PUDUKKOTTAI STATE
NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU

BULLETIN] APRIL 1, 1944 [No. 191

The Editor will gratefully receive contributions, in English or Tamil, of articles on matters of *National War Front interest*, and publish them, if suitable, as signed articles, in the Bulletin. The articles should be short and reach the Editor a week in advance.

LECTURE CXCI.

PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

From a Speech Delivered by the First Councillor Pudukkottai State on 28—3—44.

When presenting the Budget to the Pudukkottai Legislative Council.

When I presented the Budget last year, I pointed out that the Allies were daily gaining ground and dealing stunning blows to the greed and ambition of Germany and Japan. We then saw clearly the dawn of the ultimate victory of Great Britain and her Allies in this global war. What has happened since? The Russian armies are defeating the Germans in one battle after another, and are already pursuing the Germans beyond the Polish frontier on one side and threatening Rumania and the Balkans on the other. The day of the complete expulsion of the Germans from Russia is not far off. The Italians and the Germans have been driven out of Africa, and the Mediterranean has been well-nigh cleared of their menace. Mussolini has been driven to resign. The Italian Government under Marshal Badoglio has surrendered. The Allies have advanced towards Rome and are now near it. The war against the Japanese has also taken a turn for the better. Their days of expansion are over. They are gradually being forced to disgorge their ill-gotten gains one after another. A forward movement of the Indian Troops has begun on the Arakan front and steady progress is maintained. The U. S. A. Navy's threat to the main Jap Naval base at Truk has resulted in a cowardly withdrawal of the Japanese fleet from that base. The losses to our enemies, both German and Japanese have been very great on land, in the sea, and in the air. The Indian Army

has distinguished itself on all Fronts. The ultimate victory which dawned on us last year is daily coming nearer. The Allies have now definitely turned the corner and have started on their rapid march for final victory—a victory which may be won much sooner than is generally expected.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

(A)—LEADING EVENTS.

20—3—44 (Monday).	**German troops occupy** *HUNGARY.*
	Russians capture *VINNITSA* **and** *MOGILEV PODOLSKI.*
21—3—44 (Tuesday).	*FINLAND* **rejects Russian terms.**
	Russian troops cut the *CERNAUTI-BALTI* **railway.**
	Allies capture *JAMBU BUM* **and** *SUMPRA BUM* **in** *NORTH BURMA.*
	U. S. Marines land on *AMIRAU* **in** *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.*
22—3—44 (Wednesday).	**Japs cross into** *MANIPUR* **State on the** *INDO-BURMA* **Frontier.**
	Russians capture the vital Nazi base of *PERVOMAISK.*
	Americans capture *ELOMUSAO,* **another island in** *BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.*
	R.A.F. drops over 3,000 tons of bombs on *STUTTGART* **in Germany.**
23—3—44 (Thursday).	**Germans occupy** *RUMANIA.*
	Russians occupy *KAPUCHINTSY* **and** *TREMBOWLA.*
24—3—44 (Friday).	**R.A F. drops over 2,500 tons of bombs on** *BERLIN.*
25—3—44 (Saturday).	**Russians capture** *PROSKUROV,* **the German bastion.**
26—3—44 (Sunday).	**Russians occupy** *BALTI* **and have reached the Rumanian border.**

(B) NEWS IN BRIEF.

Russia.—Much has happened in RUSSIA. During the week four important German bastions fell—VINNITSA on the Bug, MOGILEV PODOLSKI and BALTI on the Dniester, and PROSKUROV on the ODESSA—LWOW railway. The Russians have now reached the Pruth on the Rumanian frontier. MOSCOW has celebrated the great event by firing a salute of 324 guns—an honour which she has shown only once before, when the siege of LENINGRAD was raised. The honour goes to the *Second* Ukrainian Army under Marshal Zhukov.

Meanwhile, the *First* Ukrainian Army under General Koniev in its drive inside POLAND has taken KAMENTS PODOLSKI, swung into BUKOVINA (a former Rumanian territory ceded to RUSSIA), and approached the Hungarian frontier at the Carpathian passes.

Troops of the *third* Ukrainian Army have occupied NIKOLAYEV, the important Black Sea port, and are now within 75 miles of ODESSA.

Italy.—The battle for CASSINO continues. Artillery duels form a principal feature, and the chief targets for the Allies are the German-held hotels—the Continental and the Des Roses. The Germans are fighting a meaningless battle here because CASSINO has ceased to be a strategic position.

Three small attacks on the ANZIO bridge-head have been repulsed.

Air War.—BERLIN had another attack, when over 1,000 R.A.F. aircraft dropped more than 2,500 tons of explosives. KIEL and ESSEN were also raided.

Burma.—Allies have occupied JAMBU BUM, SUMPRA BUM, and PINSAUGA in North BURMA.

Chinese troops have occupied SHADUZUP.

On the MANIPUR border the Japanese pressure continues. The fighting is now in the UKHRUL area about 40 miles north-east of IMPHAL and some 20 miles inside the border. According to the Japanese own admission, the present enemy operation is more of a defensive than of an offensive character. Our soldiers with their superiority in numbers and equipment are ready to get to grips with the enemy.

ALLIED AIR RAIDS.

19—3—44. (Sunday).
EUROPE (German occupied).
DAY:—
Military objectives in N. FRANCE including PAS DE CALAIS area.
Aircraft factories at KLAGENFURT and ORAZ (Austria).
Rail yards at KNIN and METKOVIC (Yugoslavia)
NIGHT:—
Targets in Central and Western GERMANY.
ITALY.
German positions in the CASSINO and ANZIO Beach-head areas.
A motor vehicle pool South of GAETA.
RUSSIA.
(61 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.
FAR EAST.
Jap Naval base at ROERABAJA (Java).
Supply areas at RABAUL.
A harbour craft at KABIRA BAY.
A Jap destroyer off HOLLAND (N. Guinea).
BURMA.
Enemy positions in the CHIN Hills, CHINDWIN and N. W. BURMA.
Railroad bridge at MOGAUNG.

20—3—44 (Monday).
EUROPE (German occupied).
DAY:—
Industries and a big railway junction FRANKFURT (Germany).
Targets in S.W. GERMANY.
Objectives in FRANCE.
NIGHT:—
An explosives works at ANGOULEME (France).
Targets in Western GERMANY.
ITALY.
(4 enemy planes shot down; 4 Allied planes missing).
Rail installations North of ROME.
AREZZO and BUCINE viaduct in ITALY.
Road traffic and gun positions in the battle areas.
Shipping off the DALMATIAN coast.
A bridge at TARQUINA.
RUSSIA.
(47 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.
FAR EAST.
A Jap convoy off WEWAK (N. Guinea) (5 Jap warships sunk).
PONAPE (Carolines).
Enemy transport in the YANGTSE River (China).
Jap held atolls in the E. MARSHALLS.
BURMA.
Enemy positions and Communications in the ARAKAN, MAYU and KALADAN areas.
Power launches off RAMREE Island (sunk).
Enemy troops in the CHIN Hills and CHINDWIN valley.
Supply dumps and troop concentrations in N. BURMA.
Targets in MOGAUNG and KAMAING areas.

21—3—44 (Tuesday).
EUROPE (German occupied).
(23 Axis planes destroyed).
DAY:—
Military objectives in the PAS DE CALAIS area.
Airfields and installations from the PYRENEES to the PARIS area.
NIGHT:—
Targets in Western GERMANY.
ITALY.
Enemy positions and communications in the CASSINO area.
RUSSIA.
(29 enemy planes shot down).
Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.
FAR EAST.
The Jap base of KAVIENG (N. Ireland).
Enemy positions in AMIRAU.

The airfields and supply dumps at RABAUL (N. Britain).

4 Jap positions in the MARSHALLS.

BURMA.

Objectives in the CHIN Hills, CHINDWIN valley, the ARAKAN, MAYU and the KALADAN areas.

Enemy troops and ammunition dumps in N. BURMA.

An ammunition dump at PAHOK (Burma).

Enemy positions in the MAWLU area.

Supply dumps at PROME.

22—3—44. (Wednesday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY :—

Objectives in the BERLIN area.

Targets in Western GERMANY.

Night :—

The industrial centre of STUTTGART (33 Allied planes missing).

BERLIN and other targets in Western GERMANY.

ITALY.

Vital railway centres of BOLOGNA, RIMINI and PADUA.

The railway at VERONA.

Rail bridges at POGGIBONSI, AREZZO and POPOLI.

Shipping off the DALMATIAN coast.

Road transport in N.W. GREECE.

RUSSIA.

(24 enemy planes shot down).

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

PONAPE and KUSAIE (Carolines).

The Jap held atolls in the MARSHALLS.

Airfields at RABAUL ((N. Britain).

Barges off WEWAK (New Guinea).

BURMA.

Dumps at TAUNGUP.

Objectives in central BURMA.

Enemy positions, enemy occupied villages and motor transport in the CHINDWIN valley, CHIN Hills, ARAKAN, MAYU, and KALADAN.

Storage dumps at MOGAUNG.

23—3—44. (Thursday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

DAY :—(61 enemy planes shot down).

The rail centres of ST. PIERRE and CREIL (near PARIS).

Luftwaffe airfields in North FRANCE.

NIGHT :—

Railway targets at LAON.

Objectives in the LYONS area.

Targets in Western GERMANY including DORTMUND.

Laying mines in enemy waters.

ITALY.

The rail yards at CAMPO DI MARTE.

A bridge at PONTASSIEVE.

Rail facilities at PADUA.

Gun positions in the CASSINO area.

A bridge at FACONARA MARITTIMA.

Shipping off the DALMATIAN coast.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

Enemy shipping, defence installations and supply areas from AITAP to CAPE MOEM in WEWAK area. N. Guinea (9 vessels and 23 barges destroyed).

The airfields at RABAUL (N. Britain).

BURMA.

Enemy occupied villages, motor transport, roads and hill tracks in the ARAKAN, MAYU, KALADAN and CHIN Hills areas.

Communications in Central and South BURMA.

The railway junction at NABA.

Enemy ground troops in the MAYU area.

24—3—44 (Friday).

EUROPE (German occupied).

(8 Allied plane missing).

DAY :—

Industrial targets in FRANKFURT and SCHWEINFURT.

Airfields at NANCY.

Night :—(73 Allied planes shot down).

BERLIN (more than 2,500 tons of bombs dropped).

KIEL.

Other objectives in Western GERMANY.

ITALY. (19

Shipping and docks at LEGHORN.

Rail facilities at ORVIETO, SULMONA and FANO.

Shipping off the W. coast of ITALY and off the DALMATIAN coast.

Troop concentrations in the CASSINO area.

Railway yards at RIMINI and ANCONA.

RUSSIA.

Air combats and grounded aircraft all along the RUSSIAN Front.

FAR EAST.

WAKE Island.

4 Jap bases in the MARSHALLS and 2 Jap bases in the CAROLINES.

The harbour at RABAUL (N. Britain).

BURMA.

Enemy positions, troops and communications in the KALADAN, MAYU, CHIN Hills, CHINDWIN, and N. W. BURMA areas.

ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

20—3—44 (Monday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

21—3—44 (Tuesday).

BRITAIN.

LONDON area (9 enemy planes shot down).

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

22—3—44 (Wednesday).

BRITAIN.

LONDON area; A few places in E. ANGLIA and S. E. ENGLAND.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No enemy air activity.

23—3—44 (Thursday).

BRITAIN.

No enemy air activity.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No information.

24—3—44. (Friday).

BRITAIN.

LONDON area (8 Nazi planes shot down).

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No enemy air activity.

25—3—44. (Saturday).

BRITAIN.

No information.

RUSSIA and FAR EAST.

No enemy air activity.

SIDE LIGHTS.

MR. CHURCHILL'S BROADCAST. Mr. Churchill's broadcast on Sunday was a homely talk, a bird's eye view of the present war situation. 'Let me carry you', he told his listeners, with his inimitable humour, which has a way of breaking out unexpectedly, even in the most serious moments, 'up in a mosquito. Let us reconnoitre the scenes of war together; let me show you the struggle in its present phases, and then you will see for yourself why I am so confident of victory'. On Sunday he said nothing extraordinary; he solved no puzzles; he would not play the prophet. On the other hand he was blunt in the Churchillian way. 'No one can tell', he said, 'not even the clever ones, when the war will end, or whether it will suddenly end or peter out. But of one thing I am certain—victory will come.' A realist of realists, he relies fundamentally on divine dispensation. To him, even in the most hopeful situation, as in the darkest hour, it is the hand of God behind the events, a divinity, that shapes what we hew rough—'it is a deliverance', as he put it, which has so far saved BRITAIN from perils and will lead her to final victory.

Faith may move mountains, but Mr. Churchill has hope and reason as well on his side. The hope is that the victories which began at EL ALAMEIN and STALINGRAD, which have driven the enemy from the African continent and practically from the whole of RUSSIA, which have secured SICILY, SARDINIA, CORSICA and a third of ITALY, which have overthrown the Fascist tyranny in ITALY, and are now shaking the BALKANS, are not going to stop till the end has been reached, and the enemy has not only been forced to disgorge his plunder but has been punished in his own home. There are good reasons too behind this hope; it is not a blind faith, or a mere wish. The best reason is the Allied supremacy at present in all the elements—land, sea and air, a matter no longer of conjecture but of several certainties—first, the certainty of the superior power of the Royal Navy, which has swept the U-boat off the Atlantic; second, the supremacy of the American Navy, which has compelled the Japanese fleet to evacuate her strongest bases and withdraw from one hiding place to another; third, the supremacy of the Anglo-American combination of air-forces, which is driving the *Luftwaffe* out of European skies; and fourth, and not least, the might of the Red Armies which have actually reached the enemy's country, having liberated their own soil. All these are no longer matters of faith, or hope or speculation but accomplished facts, and these are the solid, incontrovertible reasons for which Mr. Churchill has to entertain the hope of the inevitability of victory. If more evidence were wanted there is Hitler's growing tyranny, his jitters, his military occupation of BULGARIA and RUMANIA.

Mr. Churchill, as usual, does not lose sight of his lesser foe. He has reminded his listeners that the arm of BRITAIN is long enough to reach the Far Eastern traitor, and that in this matter also, it is no longer a matter of planning and preparation, but the beginning of accomplishment. 'The war in the Pacific', he guessed, 'may progress more rapidly than was formerly thought possible. The Japanese are showing great signs of weakness'. 'The attrition of shipping,' he added, 'especially of oil tankers, and of their air-force, on all of which President Roosevelt dwelt with sure foresight a year ago, has become not merely evident, but obvious'.

Nearer home, in BURMA, the Japanese jungle cat is being trapped. It may be too soon to proclaim the results, but we do know that the Jap has been beaten at his own

game. Individual superiority in jungle fighting has definitely passed to British and Indian soldiers. In killed, wounded and missing the Japanese losses are 'three or four times' ours.

In this theatre of war Gen. Stilwell is pushing forward vigorously. Admiral Somerville's battle fleet is guarding the Indian waters; and Admiral Mountbatten is vigorously giving shape to the plans laid down last year in QUEBEC for the recovery of BURMA and the BURMA Road.

The greatest event of it all—the invasion, is coming. The magnificent armies of the U. S. have arrived in Britain. British troops—the best trained and the best equipped ever, stand at their side in equal number. 'In order to deceive and baffle the enemy there may be many false alarms, many feints, and many dress-rehearsals, and when the signal is given, the whole circle of avenging nations will hurl themselves at the foe'.

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IN RUSSIA the Red Armies have had a phenomenal success. In a matter of 200 days they have reached the Pruth River on the frontiers of RUMANIA. Four Russian Armies co-ordinated their drives in a wide sweep, from TARNOPOL to KHERSON, along a length of 400 miles, where the Germans had strung out 50 divisions, numbering half a million men. The German aim, this time, was no longer conquest, their lure not even the iron of KRIVOI ROG or the nickel of NIKOPOL, for these dreams had been dashed to the ground long ago, but only the safety, first of RUMANIA, and of their own home land later. An attack on the BALKANS would start a rot, which could stop only when BERLIN fell. For a while, the Germans fondly rested their hopes on the Russian thaw. The thaw did set in, but it did not save the Germans. The Russian pursuit continued. This was their undoing. Zhukov, the Russian General, in a brilliant dash cut the ODESSA-LWOW railway. KONIEV, the hero of the KANEV pocket cut it again and crossed the Bug. The Third and Fourth Russian Armies forcing the Ingulets and the Ingul have reached the Black Sea, outflanking ODESSA.

During the week, several places of importance have fallen—VINNITSA—the last of the German strongholds on the Middle Bug, MOGILEV PODOLSKI, and KAMENTS PODOLSKI, German resistance centres on the Dniester, PROSKUROV, a vital junction on the ODESSA-LWOW railway, BALTI on the road to RUMANIA.

Soviet troops have crossed the Pruth and are fighting on Rumanian soil.

But as Manstein is losing all along the line and is falling back, Lord Haw Haw is winning the battle on the radio front. According to him the German retreat is still a withdrawal, 'carried out with scientific economy, providing for a valuable conservation of energies for future employment'.

But wiser than Lord Haw Haw and more responsibly, Hitler has sensed the danger aright, and rushed his troops to the Rumanian frontier, throwing to the winds his earlier promises to the Quisling regents and dictators. The Balkan jackals that followed Hitler in his heyday for pickings are now held in duress. The day has come not only for the jackals to disgorge their plunder but for them to be beaten black and blue for their earlier trespass.

Why did Hitler take this precipitate step which is so drastic and so sudden? It was General Koniev's unexpected success on the Dniester and Hitler's own foolishness. For one thing, most astonishingly, Koniev unexpectedly took in his stride the broad fast-flowing waters of the Dniester—considered inpenetrable and unassailable as a line of

defence. When the Bug was lost, the Dniester was Hitler's hope; But when the Dniester was also lost, hope itself was lost. In a certain way, Hitler is also paying the price of his own folly. In order to keep the war well beyond the BALKANS he originally strung out all his divisions along the length of the Dnieper Bend. But Manstein lost a whole army at KANEV and two more big groups on the Bug, and his remaining forces were cut in two on the way to the Dniester, the 'mechanised heart' of the German forces, as a military commentator has put it, broke. The Red Army is now on the Rumanian frontier. The Carpathians which defend HUNGARY, offer no protection to RUMANIA, however. The Danubian plains, including the oil-fields of Ploesti lie exposed. What can Hitler do? He has done what a desperate man in his situation should do; he has rushed his armies through hapless Hungary, to the Rumanian frontier.

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GOEBBELSIAN GABBLE AND THE AIR-WAR. 'To make up for any lack of military news', says Goebbels, 'the British and the Americans continue to terrorise the helpless civilian population.' Let us leave Goebbels alone with the gabble and point out the recent developments in the air-war over GERMANY, which have made it more formidable than ever.

1. Allied air-power, both in men and machines has risen to such vast proportions that it is now possible to send large forces about a thousand strong.

2. The *Luftwaffe* has now become too weak to defend even vital targets like BERLIN, MUNICH and ESSEN.

3. As the number of German fighters is decreasing, the Allies have discontinued the practice of mounting diversionary attacks.

4. For the same reason, Allied bombers are now able to attack targets outside GERMANY, without fighter escort.

5. German fighters do not get up unless the weather is very favourable. This implies either a shortage in number or defective construction.

6. It would however be a mistake to conclude that the *Luftwaffe* has been destroyed. Its casualties have not yet been so ruinous but the damage done to German aircraft production is already 50 per cent. To have got so far in so short a time is by itself an astonishing event.

7. The way to further success is a continuance of the non-stop attack. The enemy must be given no respite.

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CASSINO. has now ceased to be a strategic objective, but the Germans continue the fighting here purely for prestige, and in their madness, have lost heavily in men and equipment.

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THE PACIFIC WAR. The recent increase in tempo of the Allied successes in the Pacific is explained by Major George Fielding Eliot, the American military expert. The U. S. Fleet is now able to strike almost simultaneously at widely separated points, without taking much time to go thousands of miles back to a base in the rear, either to refuel or to re-provision. There is now a large train of tankers, tenders, ammunition, supply, repair and hospital ships 'which can accompany

the fleet on missions or meet it at sea to refuel and renew ammunition and stores'. This wonderful arrngement has practically dispensed with the neccessity for fixed bases. By this device the time-table of Allied advance in the Pacific has been speeded up. The Seventh U. S. A. A. F., was thus able to bomb the GILBERTS, making an advance of some 1,600 miles or an average of 17 miles daily. Again, after the assault on TRUK, three of five American carrier-groups were able to refuel at sea and proceed immediately to strike in the Marianas.

Another reason has been the quickness with which captured islands are immediately converted to bases for further advance. Major Eliot warns us however that "this does not mean we have beaten the enemy at sea. It only means that we can maintain at sea a fleet prepared to carry out any missions assigned to it in the Allied advance into all Pacific areas, and be ready and able to encounter the full strength of the Japanese navy at any time".

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WAR MEASURES IN PUDUKKOTTAI. On the front page we print a succinct and comprehensive review of the war situation extracted from the speech of the First Councillor of the State when he presented the Budget to the Pudukkottai Legislative Council on Tuesday. We summarise below the various measures that the State has carried out during the year, so successfully in furtherance of the war effort, and so substantially in alleviation of hardships inevitable in these hard times :—

First and foremost among them is the system of Control of Prices, not only of food grains, but of essential commodities such as sugar and kerosene, which, without resorting to rationing, has kept down prices, appreciably below levels outside the State This success is due to several causes—the vigilance and parental care of the Darbar, the arrangement by which the export of food grains has been prohibited, without placing a ban on their import, and the part played by Co-operative Stores in carrying out equitable distribution, and so defeating the wiles of the profiteer, the hoarder, and the black market.

Secondly, the general rise of prices above the pre-war level has helped the ryots to pay their taxes in spite of partial failure of rain, and the State not only to present a surplus budget for the year but also to build up its reserve substantially.

Thirdly, 30,600 acres of land have been reclaimed under the Grow More Food Drive.

Fourthly, the War Effort has been furthered during the year by the investment of Rs. 36,000 of public money in War Loans and Rs. 4,30,400 in War Bonds ; and by the successful propaganda carried out by the National War Front Bureau.

Fifthly, the State has found employment for 800 men in the Assam Labour Forces, besides others, up to a thousand in all, as War Technicians and in other similar War Services.

Sixthly, Special arrangements have been made to help the BURMA and MALAYA evacuees, and the families of the men who have joined the War Services.

We may remind the readers in this place, of His Highness the Raja's promise of a Mosquito bomber to mark the occasion of his Investiture with Ruling Powers, and of the

other contributions made by the Pudukkottai Government and people, which at the beginning of the present financial year stood as follows:—(Round figures are given).

1.	War Purposes Fund	Rs. ...	50,680
2.	Ambulance ...	„ ...	1,00,000
3.	Silver Trinket ...	„ ...	2,332
4.	War Plane ...	„ ...	78,565
5.	Hellenic War Fund	„ ...	1,000
6.	London (Air Raid Victims)		
7.	Relief Fund ...	Rs. ...	598
8.	China Day Fund ...	„ ...	5,500
9.	War Fund (Pudukkottai)	„ ...	98,147
10.	Red Cross Fund ...	„ ...	8,164
11.	Polish Refugees Fund	„ ...	1,440
		...	3,46,426

WORK HARDER.

By

Capt. G. T. B. Harvey.

(Broadcast from the All India Radio, Madras).

This is a true story from a private letter from England. A man engaged in a munition factory was due to arrive at his work at 6-30 a.m., every morning. One day he arrived at 6-40, and was ticked off by the foreman.

"Why are late ?" asked the foreman.

"I'm sorry," said the man, "but the fact is that I had to hand my baby over to his grandmother."

"Grandmother, my eye ?" said the foreman. "Haven't you got a wife ?"

"Yes," said the man, "but she has to get work at Austin's at 6 a.m., so we get her mother to take charge."

"Well," said the foreman "if your wife goes to work at 6, and you know you have to get here by 6-30, why can't you arrange to hand the baby over to granny a bit earlier?"

"Because my mother-in-law doesn't get off night-shift until 6.30!" was the reply.

I begin this talk with that story because it does seem to me to illustrate a case of 100 per cent war-effort, and what is true of that ordinary family is true of millions of people in Britain and Europe to-day. In spite of the fact that the worst onslaught of the enemy has been survived—in spite of the fact that victory for the Allies and the defeat of Nazism is now as certain as anything can possibly be—that family—those millions—are as hard at work as they were four years ago, with every physical and mental effort enlisted, and with a great proportion of the amenities and pleasures and comforts of life discarded "for the duration."

Out here, we hear the wireless, and read the papers, and see the pictures—and applaud the determination and gallantry and self-sacrifice of our friends and relatives and allies, but how many of us individually and inwardly realize that we too are at war and that—I express a private opinion only—a war which for India is just beginning.

HARSH AND GRIM WAR.

Of course, there are some people who are extremely hard at work, there are many who have contributed handsomely to funds, or pay extra income-tax without grumbling, or take an extra and honorary jobs; and again millions upon whom the incidental unpleasantnesses of a global war have fallen—shortage of food, fuel, and consumer-goods; hampered and uncomfortable transport; and anxieties about sons and brothers who *are* doing 100 per cent war-work in that they have taken the plucky plunge and are serving in the field. But, by-and-large, are the people—all the people in this country—intimately aware that there faces us a war almost as harsh and grim as that in Europe, a war that must go on for years, perhaps, and—unless every jack man of us feels and acts like that English workman's family I have told you of—for more years than that? Nor is that the end of it, for not only has the war against Japan to be finished to our satisfaction and their perdition, but its direct reactions upon the political and economic conditions in this country, and the impact of the peace itself have to be comprehended, studied and worked at, unless chaos and misery are to result where there should be security and happy progress.

I am no Cassandra of the legends, nor do I enjoy croaking like a debilitated raven, but I do feel that there is *need* sometimes to remind ourselves that nothing less than cent per cent effort from each of us will do, and here are some of my reasons for saying so.

The first is that whatever war-adventure we have already experienced, be it discomfort or strain, hunger or poverty, bereavement or deprivation, there are surely bigger ones in the offing against which we have to brace ourselves. If the war in Europe draws towards a close in a climax of bloodshed and destruction, we have only just begun to come to grips with the Eastern Foe. He made his treacherous spring just about two years ago, and the impetus of that spring was as unpleasant for us as it was encouraging to him. Burma, Siam, Indo-China and the big islands to the south of them are at his mercy still; he successfully stole a large number of marine and aerial vantage-grounds from the Americans and ourselves, which—though he is losing them one by one—must long form a series of dangerous pirates' nests; he has enormous armies, a great part of an enormous navy, and highly disciplined and war-minded home-front. He is, in short, a bad enemy, so bad a component of that body of nations forming what we know as the civilized world, that there is no chance of peaceful security in any land in the Eastern Hemisphere at least until he is thrashed into submission to the laws of humanity. Now it has taken 4½ years of bitterly concentrated effort to teach Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania a mere part of the lesson they have got to learn—and they are all, geographically, comparatively concentrated. So, personally I don't see why it should take much less time to overcome the Japanese, with the enormous distances separating them from, and protecting them against, the avenging Allies. Certainly, many and vast bases have to be prepared against them far nearer than America and Britain; and—and this is my main point—one of these, and perhaps the principal one, is to be this India. We have strong evidence of it; the South-East Asia Command is already at work. India is to be one of the principal take-off-places for a mighty and strenuous triphibious operation against one of the worst and most powerful enemies civilization has ever had to stand up to. Think what this means to us non-combatants. Millions of men and their road transport moving into, through and out of depôts; and thousands of trainloads of troops and supplies and ammunition constantly on the move; thousands of planes, great

and small, taking off from, and homing back to, hundreds of air fields; thousands of sea-craft entering and leaving the country's harbours; hundreds of supply depóts and training centres and munition factories all over the country—all together constituting a military spring-board from which the Allies are to leap at the enemy's throat. This is a picture of power, a comforting-enough picture, but confidence and complacency are two very different things, and this is a lesson that at least a part of the country has still to learn.

MAIN OBJECTIVE OF N. W. F.

I am no alarmist. I am convinced that ultimately we have the measure of the Japanese, on sea, land and in the air. But to the complacent I would address this question. Supposing you were a member of the Japanese High Command, anxiously conscious of powerful concentric pressure against your island-country, increasing south-wards through the Aleutians and Kiska, northwards through the Solomons and the Marshalls and Truk, and east-wards from the Coromandel and Carnatic coasts, what would you do? Would you sit and wait for unhampered hosts to hurl themselves at your inner defences, or would you sally out and put their programme out of gear by doing as much damage as you could to their base concentrations? If you think this out, is it so certain that war, physical, actual war, will not come to these shores,—to this very city perhaps? Whether or not such enemy attacks can be held away from us by diverting land action, or by the navy or the air force, is neither here nor there; the point is that Eastern India must be a tempting target for a desperate foe, and with such large masses of uninformed and unstable people to look after and prevent from panicking and interrupting war-work, every intelligent person has his work fully cut out. The National War Front's main objective is just that—to interest, inform and inspire the uninformed, the apathetic, the complacent and the defeatist. But there are dozens of other ways in which the morale of the country can be strengthened by the average man and woman,—by individual self-denial and austerity, by practising and preaching the saving habit instead of the spending habit—to assist the vital cause of anti-inflation; by active regular work on behalf of troops (for example Red Cross and Amenities work in all its forms, working parties, first-aid, nursing, etc.), or on behalf of troops' families (for instance, Forces Welfare work, service with Soldiers' Boards); or again by supplementing the work of the National War Front by personal contact with the puzzled, worried masses, explaining the foundations for the Allies' confidence, as also the inevitability of hardship, the necessity for unrelaxed effort and cheerful compliance with every requirement and restriction which Government has to impose, and confidence in our war-leadership.

These things may all seem vague. But the fact is that the money you save or the speeches you make or the number of socks you can knit are not in themselves the prime factor. It is rather the enormous influence of personal example. The more men or women who doggedly and regularly give all their spare time without pay, possibly at their own cost, and without any thought of reward, to war-work of whatever kind, so much the greater the national realization of the emergency. That is what is wanted—a national realization—and the force of personal example is the greatest of all the factors likely to produce a steadfast and victorious morale.

DUTY OF THE OPPOSITION.

The title of this talk is "Work Harder," but may I warn listeners of a few activities, to which this exhortation definitely does *not* apply? This country, I submit, is apt to over-indulge the theory that the duty of the opposition is to oppose. I don't

believe that, in war, this is necessarily so. Constructive political criticism is always welcome but *mere* irresponsible criticism, often couched in a personal vein, against a Government or a party or a person merely because their peacetime theories vary from yours, is a prejudicial and dangerous course to pursue at a time like this.

All I ask, in the interest of a cause which *must* be made victorious if we citizens of India are to survive, let alone to flourish, is that whether the atmosphere we live in is that of high politics or party-counsels or religious conferences, or even committees of the various war-efforts themselves, opinions should be subjective and sober and consciously subordinated to the exigencies of the times.

RUSSIAN WEATHER DOES NOT OBLIGE GERMANS.

(*The Times*).

Among the many miscalculations that have dogged German strategy throughout the Russian war, the most persistent have concerned the effect of weather upon the operations. After the first false estimate of Russian fighting capacity—which the enemy had expected to overwhelm in the summer season of 1941—had been exposed, and the onrush of invasion halted before the gates of Moscow, the Germans consoled themselves with the reflection that a period of inaction would ensue, during which they could build up their strength in comfortable winter quarters, and prepare for complete conquest in 1942.

Their first great climatic surprise came when they found their adversaries fully able to keep the field through the severities of the Russian winter; they were made to fight hard during the months in which they had expected to rest, and to yield considerable territory; and when a change of season was restored to their advantage, it turned out insufficient to settle the issue. Their deep penetration to the Volga and the Caucasus ended in a trap instead of triumph; although this time they had prepared for a winter campaign, they found Russian superiority in the snow greater than ever, and had to submit to the destruction of one army and headlong retreat of another across the frozen steppes.

They were still buoyed up, however, by reliance on the ascertained fact that summer weather favoured their tactics. In 1943 that support catastrophically failed them; the long start they had gained by superior readiness for war was exhausted at last, and in the campaign that continued practically without intermission through the late spring summer, autumn and winter, the Russians swept them back from the Donetz to the Dnieper, broke their prepared positions on that river, stormed Kiev, and flung out a gigantic salient into Poland 250 miles to the west. Then they turned upon Hitler's investing armies before Leningrad, and, by threat of rolling up the whole line, compelled them to fall back to the borders of the Baltic States.

In all these accumulating disasters one prospect at least seemed to hold out to the enemy the certainty of a respite at last. He was outclassed in winter, fighting, he had become markedly inferior even in the summer; but, in the intervening period of the spring thaw, all precedent assured him that the attacking armies must cease from pursuit. Now, however, even that expectation has proved false, and he has been denuded of comfort. The spring thaw has come early to the Ukraine, and the frosts have dissolved into an ocean of mud; but, over it or through it, the Red Army is turning its manifold experience of war to such account that it can now adapt its tactics to any circumstance

and overcome any natural obstacles, and is still pressing the battered German formations irresistibly backward. The pressure of the Red Army is everywhere increasing, and the pace of its movement is decidedly greater than the weather prophets of friend or foe could have foreseen.

AIR FORCE'S RÔLE IN ARAKAN VICTORY.

by

(Wing Commander L. V. Frazer).

Mr. Churchill's congratulatory message to Lord Louis Mountbatten on the decisive Allied victory in the bitterly-fought battle of the Arakan, has revealed in a new place the now highly-developed pattern of Allied land and air co-operation.

The whole outcome of this battle depended on air supply to the Seventh Division during the time they were cut off from the rest of the British troops, the other 'hedgehogs' of the Allied ground forces. It was the gallant fighting of this force that brought about the heavy and costly reverse of the Japanese. Even under ordinary conditions roads are unknown in the dense Burmese jungle, and Major General Masservy's Seventh Division could not have held the Japanese at bay for more than a few days without regular air supplies dropped to them mainly by Dakotas.

Nor was this enough in itself. Air power had to assume an offensive character, in order to inflict as much damage as possible on the surrounding Japanese force thus loosening its hold.

DIVE BOMBERS WERE THERE.

Allied dive-bombers and fighter bombers combined their maximum striking force with that of the British relief columns driving towards the encircled force from the north, with the object of pressing the Japanese against the existing 'hedgehogs,' squeezing them out of their favourite positions.

While Vengeance dive-bombers blasted a path for the advancing relief columns, fighters and fighter-bombers inflicted the maximum of damage to delay disorganisation in Japanese supplies and ammunition. These essentials, which were being conveyed to the Japanese in carts and sampans, received a terrific and continuous pounding from the guns and bombs of Allied fighters, especially by cannon shells from the tank-busting hurricanes.

As a result of the intricate network of waterways round the Mah Mayu Peninsula, the war swept almost clear the small river craft, on which the Japanese supplies mainly depended.

Meanwhile, heavy and medium American and British bombers of the Strategic Air Force entered the picture, dovetailing their operations with perfect precision into those of the fighters. In the south, they bombed the Japanese base areas beyond the reach of Allied fighters. Vast stores accumulated by the Japanese to reinforce the Arakan front were blasted and fired. Railways needed for forwarding these supplies also suffered. Rolling stock and engines were shattered, and complete disorganisation resulted.

MASTERY OVER ENTIRE FRONT.

The crushing weight of this finely synchronised air blow would not have been sufficient without complete air superiority along the entire front. Here British Spitfires came into their own, sweeping opposition from the skies, giving full protection to every type of Allied aircraft engaged in this vast operation.

During the early stages of the Arakan battle, the Japanese went to great lengths to scrape together enough aircraft for the job in hand. Realising this war's primary lesson—that without adequate air strength no ground operation can hope to succeed—they flew a number of offensive sorties, in the vain hope of achieving some kind of local air supremacy.

The best they could do was not nearly good enough. Their bombers suffered repeatedly from inadequate air cover, and their fighters proved inferior in every encounter. Spitfires inflicted such losses on them that they were forced to abandon the idea. As a result, Japanese bombers remained grounded for lack of adequate fighter cover. Strategic as well as tactical air designs of the enemy collapsed completely.

BERLIN DAYLIGHT RAIDS.

(By Colston Shepherd)

Two things in the main can be regarded as responsible for the ultimate penetration of British-based American heavy bombers to Berlin. Those two things are tactical ingenuity and a sufficiently high production to make its application possible.

If the simplification is carried a stage farther, production alone can be taken to be the heart of the business. A strange thing is that fighter production and not bomber production is the vital element. No one would hold that Fortresses and Liberators could have gone to Berlin without fighter escorts. Some of them undoubtedly would have fought their way through and dropped their bombs. Some of the residue would have fought their way home again, but losses would probably have been excessive, and the high production of Fortresses and Liberators would only have met the case if there was an equally big flow of crews. Ten or eleven men, who form the crew of a heavy bomber, take longer to train than a Fortress takes to build.

Apart from humane considerations, which rightly demand that lives shall not be needlessly sacrificed, purely practical limitations tend to assert themselves more promptly on the crew side than on the aircraft side. When the theory of putting in bombers and accepting losses was first put forward, the modern high speed production of aircraft had not been devised. The assumption then was that the few that fighters had the enemy, unaided by the radio, would grope blindly about the sky, and would be lucky to find bombers, and would be most unlikely to bring them down in large numbers. Experience in the past three years has shown how things have changed.

Enemy fighters do make contact with bombers generally, and take a toll of them. Bomber units of the Eighth Air Force found out for themselves that this was true, as soon as they began their raids on the German-occupied Europe rather more than a year ago. For a time they met the Germans with concentrated fire of cleverly arranged formations.

Gradually they came to the conclusion that wherever German fighters were likely to appear in droves, some additional protection would be needed. In providing themselves with that support the Americans have done an excellent piece of work. They found a solution to the puzzle which had seemed insoluble. If heavies were to go to Berlin from British bases, they had to face a journey 500 miles each way, and the prospect of fighting over a distance of about 300 miles on the way in and another 300 miles on the way out.

Fighter escort for a trip like that would have been impossible in 1939. A fighter which could carry enough fuel for 1,000 miles, and enough ammunition for 600 miles of combat, would have been so big and heavy that it would be no match for short-range single-engine fighters that the Germans could send up from home bases. Such a fighter is impossible to-day. In all such difficulties a way begins to clear if only one of the conditions can be fulfilled. The idea of taking high performances from the single seat fighter, giving it extra range, was tackled by the British as soon as the evacuation of France showed that they must thenceforth rely only on bases in Britain. The Americans followed the same line in seeking a solution, and the external detachable tank is the answer.

These tanks are usually streamlined, egg-shaped containers set under the wing towards the tips. In the R. A. F. Spitfire, auxiliary tanks, wedge-shaped, fit close up under the centre of a section of a wing—virtually under the fuselage. They may carry between them anything from 90 to 150 gallons. Wing-tanks can be shed like old slippers the moment a fighter sees combat in the prospect, or as soon as all fuel in them has been used. When once they have been allowed to fall away the fighter is as good in speed and powers of manoeuvre as ever it was. It has gained in range without sacrificing performance. That range can only be useful to it so long as the fighter has ammunition left to use against the enemy. When the ammunition is finished, it goes home. Most fighter pilots find their ammunition boxes empty after they have pressed the firing button at the most six times. The ammunition therefore remained a limiting factor.

The solution of that puzzle was to throw fresh fighters into the battle, at a time when those on duty might be reckoned to be coming to an end of their bullets or shells. That was the point at which supply became vital.

Plenty of fighters would be needed if they were to fly out in relays to provide escort reliefs at successive stages on a long journey. Heavy bombers now attacking Germany in daylight are going out by the hundred. The Germans send their fighters up in great numbers to attack them. One pilot who went to Berlin recently estimated that something like 150 fighters delivered attacks on his formation as it made its bombing run over the city. Mustangs which look after the most distant stages of the journey needed to be there too in strength. Lightings and Thunderbolts shared the escorting work on the earlier stages. They were enabled to reserve their strength for fighting over Germany by the British Spitfires, which covered the bombers on the way across the North sea and into occupied Europe.

Escorting on this scale is an ingenious and intricate method of overcoming the disadvantage of distance. The duty has been tackled with skill by the staff, and has been worked out admirably by the fighter units. They have provided a lever which opens up Germany—the most screened parts of Germany—to big bombers by day. They are paving the way for daylight raids comparable in weight to the night raids the British have been making for 18 months.

In the last resort, they have to thank the massive production machine which 3,000 to 4,000 miles away is turning out fighters almost like sausages.

AUTOMATIC PHOTOGRAPHY BY BOMBERS STORY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

By Wing Commander L. V. Frazer.

The battle of Berlin, with its recent heavy saturation,—bombing of industrial areas, carefully pinpointed and defined by flares of the R. A. F., path finder force, has also brought a culminating point in the long painstaking technical research that now makes possible extensive night photography.

As far back as May 31, 1940, a successful night photograph was obtained of bombs being dropped on a railway yard during the Battle of France. The entire technique and strategy of night bombing has since undergone revolutionary changes, while the simultaneous process of photographing the target area under bombardment has had equally important improvements.

The theory of night photography appears simple enough. It is to synchronise the opening of a camera shutter with the explosion of the magnesium flash-bomb released from an aircraft at the same time as its destructive load.

In practice things are not so easy. Weather, bombing height and flak opposition all enter into it. Searchlights, the crazy pattern of tracer bullets, and the myriad of twinkling lights caused by the fires below, are all apt to play havoc with the sensitive film, the exposure of which lasts for only about one-thirtieth of a second. The pilot often has to take sudden, violent and evasive action immediately after the bomb release, further adding to the difficulties.

All those and other factors had to be taken into account, in evolving a foolproof and an entirely automatic method of photographing bomb bursts at night, from a height possibly of 20,000 feet.

The simplicity of the basic theory became lost in this maze of complications, so that each point had to be studied and overcome by technical improvement as and when it arose.

A FLASH TELLS THE PILOT.

Nowadays, the volume of flak put up by the Germans over important target areas makes the actual bombing run the most hazardous part of any big scale raid.

Every member of the crew is in a sense fully occupied with his job, so that the camera must be able to do its work with completely automatic precision, without the slightest attention from any one in the bomber.

British photographic technicians have made such strides, during three years of continuous research, that the only indication that a pilot now has during the crucial moment when pictures are taken is the warning light flashing on his instrument panel. So successful has this method been, that every aircraft in the bomber command is now fitted with a camera before going on an operational flight. The ground staff photographic section adjusts and sets the camera controls to suit the height from which the bombing run is to be made. Everything is checked so that the camera shutter opens at a predetermined moment after the bomb-aimer has depressed the bomb firing key.

The flash-bomb is an ingenious mechanism, and externally resembles a small bomb of an ordinary type. It is about 3 feet long, 4½ inches in diameter and is fused to explode at about half the height at which the aircraft is flying. The tail unit is rather smaller than

that of the standard bomb in relation to its size. A feature in its design results in the flash bomb trailing further behind the aircraft than the ordinary missile. The object is to make the bomb explode just far enough behind the aircraft to illuminate the target without blurring or blotting the camera's field of view.

Along with the vast camera improvements, the flash bomb itself has been subjected to changes that result in an enormous increase of lighting power. The early magnesium bombs developed three to four million candle power at the best. The latest have the peak flash intensity of about 170,000,000 candle power.

The most important picture is that taken the moment the flash explodes. Everything is so calculated that the main bombload, falling faster than the photo flash, is just about to hit the target as the camera shutter opens for its split second exposure. The results are no less amazing. The film when developed shows an instantaneous picture of the target super-imposed on the photographic record of other lighting such as fires, searchlight beams, tracer and gun-flashes.

WAR AND THE GREEK ISLANDS.

(From The Times).

Although the Middle East has dropped out from war news, operations still continue in this theatre.

They consist of ceaseless and successful efforts by the R. A. F. and the Royal Navy to prevent the Germans from building up, supplying and reinforcing their island bases off the coast of Greece.

Day and night, except for short periods when bad weather curtails operations, heavy and medium bombers of the R. A. F. and Allied Air forces wage ceaseless war against German lines of communication, which radiate from bases in Greece down the Aegean and Ionian seas to the island fortresses which guard the vulnerable mainland.

So successful have these attacks on shipping been that not only is the enemy in desperate straits for transport, but the garrisons on some of the islands are believed to be nearly starving. During the last two months, three merchant ships of roughly 5,000 tons each have been destroyed; these, it is thought, represent the last large ships that the enemy has. The bulk of the supplies is now sent by small schooners and caiques, the former ranging between 500 and 300 tons, and the last named no more than 100 tons. The amount of supplies which can be carried by this means, even when, as is the case, the boats are almost overloaded, and carry cargo piled on the deck sometimes reaching halfway up the mast, is not great, and, as many of them are sunk, the garrisons go for weeks, often for months, without receiving supplies.

There is even a grave scarcity of these small ships, and R. A. F. reconnaissance aircraft bring reports of new vessels being constructed at various places on the Greek coast; as soon as such reports are received, aircraft are sent out to destroy the ships. These small ships slink along the coast during the night, and shelter in bays and inlets during the day, but our bombers and fighters are expert at finding their hide-outs, and the shores of some of these little bays are littered with wreckage while masts stick out from the water all along the coast. The urgency of getting supplies through is demonstrated by the exaggerated escorts now given to the shipping. A few days ago, when the R. A. F.

spotted the last 5,000 tonner, it was found to be escorted by two destroyers and 16 aircraft. This did not prevent the vessel from being hit, fired and burned out, while the destroyers also were severely damaged, and several aircraft were destroyed.

Earlier, the Germans tried for a time to use transport aircraft-Ju-52s- as the shipping so rarely got through, but this was even more disastrous, and after 15 had been lost in four days the practice seems to have been discontinued.

The campaign is not without its dangers; we have lost approximately one aircraft a day; German air losses, however, have been at least twice as heavy, and as they are far shorter of aircraft than we, they can ill afford this constant drain on their resources. From bases all over the Middle East Command, Liberators and Halifaxes, Mitchells, Marauders, Baltimores, Wellingtons and Beaufighters carry on this unceasing attack, getting little publicity but doing an important job extremely well.

FEW LOSSES IN VAST SEA OPERATIONS.

(By A. McWhinnie).

Britain's naval losses sustained in big-scale amphibious operations so far have been only a fraction of what London had expected and allowed for. That is a significant point behind the figures of Britain's Mediterranean naval losses, as outlined by Mr. A. V. Alexander, British First Lord of Admiralty, during the recent presentation of navy estimates.

It came as a surprise to world capitals that in the eight months which followed the Sicilian landings, eight months in which the British navy undertook so many bold and courageous Mediterranean ventures, the losses were only two cruisers, one mine-layer, 10 destroyers, two submarines and 10 minor war vessels.

Losses during the critical Anzio beach-head landings were amazingly light, despite the major part the British navy played so fearlessly in the operation. They amounted to two cruisers, two destroyers and five major landing craft.

GREAT ARMADAS.

But to get the right perspective on the naval operations during the big-scale landings one has to remember the total craft employed. No fewer than 850 ships were engaged for the landings in North Africa, while the armada for Sicily comprised 3,253 vessels. No figures have been released so far of the forces involved in the Anzio landings. But they were probably greater still.

The Mediterranean stretches 2,000 miles from Gibraltar to Alexandria. There are British warships patrolling and convoying along the whole length of both the coasts, apart altogether from the spectacular bombardments against the German positions. The announced losses must be fitted into the picture with that background; ships lurking in harbour cannot win wars.

Mr. Alexander's disclosures to the British Parliament prove conclusively how great is the failure of the German sea and air forces at such a crucial stage of the war. British naval losses in ships and men have been very much smaller than most observers had expected, and much smaller than even most pessimistic Germans had anticipated.

EXPECTED INVASION LOSSES.

There is still the biggest amphibious operation of all to come for the liberation of Hitler's Europe. Mr. Churchill and other Allied spokesmen have said that they expect heavy losses in achieving a foothold on the Continent. Figures from the Mediterranean hold out a heartening hope that there too the losses may be smaller than the Allies have allowed for and expect.

In the meantime, and apart altogether from the invasion operation from Britain, there is little doubt that a new flare-up in the war at sea can be anticipated. The world should soon be hearing of new blows and counter-blows in waters as widely separated as the North Atlantic and the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

HOSTS OF SUBMARINE HUNTERS.

After an extensive tour of British Atlantic ports during the last few days, I have been given abundant evidence of British preparedness for any new U-boat campaign. At no time since the war began were there so many destroyers, sloops, frigates, corvettes and land-based as well as sea-borne aircraft able to line up against U-boat packs. There is still no evidence that U-boats are able to cope with the new Allied anti-submarine weapons of detection and destruction, which Admiral Doenitz himself admits have given the British navy supremacy over his U-boats.

WARFARE OF THE FLEET.

(From the Times).

The First Lord of the Admiralty, introducing the naval estimates on March 7, made his customary annual survey of warfare of the Fleet.

This speech is—as any speech made in the enemy's hearing must be—no more than a token of the vast and mysterious activities to which it darkly alludes. Far away and dim the King's ships, great and small, loom in the background of record. Even if there were no need for secrecy, it would be impossible to evoke an adequate picture of the sea war. The scale of the drama is too large for the mind to comprehend. The stage is the globe, and there is only one act, which lasts without intermission from the declaration of war till the surrender of the last of our enemies.

There have been, as Mr. Alexander remarked at the opening of his speech, spectacular moments in the course of this critical year. One occurred on the day when capital ships of the surrendered Italian fleet dropped anchor under the guns of invincible Malta; another when the mighty *Scharnhorst*, outmanoeuvred and outfought, sank beneath the Arctic Sea. Both events were the culminations of victorious campaigns of great import; both were consummated to the accompaniment of the world's applause. Yet a scene of still more profound significance in the grand dramatic design had been silently played in a few days following the vernal equinox, when losses of merchant ships in the Atlantic suddenly dropped by two-thirds to a low figure round which they have continued to fluctuate ever since.

This transformation of the Atlantic Battle was not an accidental reversal of fortune. It crowned years of planning, and the strategy had been executed in a series of great actions, which broke the sinister power of U-boats by hard fighting, but of which next to nothing has been told to the world.

The First Lord warned the House that the Navy must fight as hard to maintain as to win what has been gained in the Atlantic. It is the one field of war in which the enemy can never afford to abandon the struggle. In spite of the fearful execution done among the German Submarines last year, the threat from the U-boat will undoubtedly revive, probably in new forms, to be countered by new measures. The battle against them is still placed deservedly first in any account of naval strategy.

The task of sea-power consists wholly in keeping open lines of communication about the globe; and for the United Nations the line across the Atlantic is supremely indispensable. For the British Empire in particular, the next most important is that which runs through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal; its re-opening to Allied ships has been one of the outstanding victories of the year. By controlling communications within the sea, the navy, making full use, as in all its operations, of its air component, has successfully landed great armaments first in Sicily and then on the Italian mainland. Later on the disablement of the *Tirpitz*, and the destruction of the *Scharnhorst*, cleared in the far north a third great line of communication of the European war, and thereby made a potent contribution to the triumphs of the Red Army in the East.

There stood out—through the necessary reticences of Mr. Alexander's speech—some hint of the enormous complexity which the continual advance of scientific invention introduces into naval war. The universal participation of the air arm in every sort of sea action has rendered nearly all the experience gained in previous wars obsolete; and having envolved a new technique to meet new needs, Naval Commanders have to be ready at all times to abandon it and learn again from the beginning.

The results show that in the ceaseless race with scientific changes the Navy still keeps ahead of its adversaries, maintaining its lead not only by the inventive vigour by which it is served, but by the resource and valour of the men who use the new inventions.

In his closing references, Mr. Alexander turned to the climax of the War that still awaits the Navy. The final issue has to be settled with another island power, strong in ships and seamanship, on the other side of the globe. Control of communications will play an even greater part in the Far Eastern theatre than it has done in Europe, for armament sufficient to overwhelm a great military nation has to be transported halfway round the world, and when there to operate over the great distances of the largest of oceans. But Mr. Alexander's account of the tremendous engine of sea power that has been welded by so many hands, afloat and ashore and in the air, in the course of the struggle with Germany, gives a measure of the might that will be released after Germany's surrender to fall on Japan. To this force will be added in good time the full weight of the Royal Navy, which has fought its way from the western seas. It will bring the Far East not only its own fighting power on, under and over the water, but all the strength for land operations that can be conveyed by the merchant fleet, which has co-operated with it with unfailing devotion through more than four years of war. It is for Japan an agent of inescapable doom.

LESSONS OF STRIKE IN NORTH ITALY.
FLAME OF RESISTANCE STILL BURNING.

(*The Times*).

Even on the showing of the German-controlled Rome Radio, the recent strike in Northern Italy was disconcertingly formidable for the Germans and their Fascist tools.

It involved more than 200,000 workers, and it brought several important war factories to stop in some places, and it was maintained for four days.

It was organised as a demonstration of solidarity with the British and American forces now engaged in freeing the Italian soil from the alien occupier, and there is reason to believe that at least some of the employers gave practical support to the strike. It had, therefore, a significance which is not to be underrated. It has shown that terrorism which the Germans have introduced into North Italy, as into every other occupied country, has completely failed to crush the movement of resistance.

The spirit of the industrial North is robust and obstinate, and is now being widely organised and resolutely directed to a slowing down of war production for the enemy. The recent strike is a brave contribution to the Allied and to the Italian cause of liberation, and an example to other more timorous champions of co-belligerency.

BRUTAL EFFICIENCY.

The German rule in the north is brutally efficient. The workers who took part in the strike were even threatened with deportation to Poland, the grim consequences of which they showed themselves, nevertheless, ready to face.

Since the armistice in September, the struggle has never ceased although it has perforce been driven underground, and becomes too often an affair of ambushes and sorties. In their efforts to win adherents for the German cause, Mussolini and his Neo-Fascists have gone to extraordinary lengths. Plans for the nationalisation of industry have been paraded—and other far-reaching reforms promised, clearly with no other intention than to secure the people's acquiescence in working for the Germans.

North Italy cannot yet take its full part in the struggle for the deliverence of Italy, but the strikers of Milan, Turin and Florence have shown that the flame of resistance has not been extinguished.

BRITAIN—AN ARSENAL OF INCREASING STRENGTH.

TRIUMPH OF INTENSIVE INDUSTRIAL EFFORT.

For nearly five years Great Britain has been an arsenal of massively increasing strength and striking power. A strict seal of silence, necessary to keep the enemy in ignorance of the scale and character of these preparations, has kept the people of Britain and those of our Allies in ignorance also. To the public benefit as well as that of inter-Allied relations, Mr. Lyttelton has uncovered a page of statistics.

Even though few may know in terms of design and planning, of materials and hours of work, what is required for the manufacture of an armoured division, a warship or a squadron of aeroplanes, Mr. Lyttelton's figures were an impressive statement on the sustained and intensive efforts of British Industry.

It is a striking fact that Britain has produced 90,000 aircraft since the beginning of the war, and that combat planes make up four-fifths of the present output. Mass production of tanks began later, and of tanks, armoured cars and carriers together the production has been 83,000 while a million unarmoured vehicles have been built. Mr. Lyttelton's other figures were of corresponding magnitude, soaring up to 7,000,000,000 rounds of small arms, ammunition which the mind can hardly grasp. It can however

be calculated that the store of small arms ammunition is the equivalent of something, like a thousand rounds for every German Soldier in the field.

Nevertheless, these figures exclude much of the other production, and particularly the building of vessels for landings in Europe from the west. Millions of work people know but one particle or another of this immense output of armaments and no more. To see large round figures is exhilarating.

They do not measure anything like the whole of the war undertaking, nor is their publication to be taken as part of the stock-taking that precedes the final winding up. They are rather an encouragement and inspiration to the supreme endeavour to overwhelm the enemy by the force of arms and armour and lay him low beyond the power of recovery.

To meet, by the utmost deployment of resources and at whatever personal sacrifice the latest demands of all the armed forces, to supply them and keep them supplied with fully sufficient equipment—that is the task. Industry has gone steadily and rapidly forward, developing its means by adapting and training millions of unskilled workers to the production of intricate and highly finished machines and weapons ; and its largely improvised labour force has become an increasingly efficient instrument. **A remarkable fact is the increase in the output of every worker employed, of two per cent in each of the last six months.**

Several things must have contributed to these noteworthy results—the increased efficiency of the workers, particularly of women who have been acquiring mastery of machines, dexterity of workmanship, improvements in tool design and works management, and co-operation between the bench and office which has contributed not only to technical efficiency but also to understanding and smooth working. It is necessary at times for works managements and work people to act in blind obedience to the instructions that come down from Government departments. Secrecy may be required to veil the reasons for changes in design, or even for cessation of work that only a short time previously was being urged forward with high priority. There may be more of these changes in the coming months.

Important variations of programme are already being planned, and it will be remarkable if as the operations develop unforeseeable changes do not become necessary. Industry must be as alert to supply as the armed forces must be quick to discover adaptations which the test of battle demands. So, far from urgency having gone out of war production, exactly the contrary is the fact, as Mr. Lyttelton desires every one to know.

SEA AND AIR ATTACKS AGAINST JAPAN'S ECONOMY.

DECLINING SHIPPING STRENGTH.

Japan's strength in ships is of primary importance, in view of the vast ocean areas she conquered so ruthlessly. It is an illuminating development of the Allied policy of increasingly forceful attacks delivered steadily by sea and air against the economy of Japan, that in the last six months Japan's shipping strength has continued to decline, and more rapidly than before. British submarines, in their tireless lethal-ranging of the Pacific, have to a large degree contributed to this deterioration.

Japan's wooden shipbuilding programme, which was to have supplemented the steel shipbuilding in an attempt to offset sinkings continues, but she has nothing comparable to the facilities that Britain and the United States have for prefabrication of steel vessels, or for expansion of shipyards for steel ships. Any success she may achieve in her efforts to complete her 1943 wooden shipbuilding programme this year must be outweighed by the ever increasing Allied power to disrupt her economic life. So many tankers and supply-ships have been sunk by naval action now that Japan is finding the maintenance of her Fleet a problem. The absence of any large war-ships at Truk as Admiral Nimitz remarked recently, was probably due to difficulties of maintenance. The tonnage she has cannot meet all Japan's requirements for her armed forces, for the transport of oil and raw materials essential to the pursuit of war. When it is remembered how singularly dependent on shipping is the whole of the Japanese Greater East Asia sphere, and how inadequately supplied with roads and railways is the vast area over which Japanese forces operate, it will be realised that geography is on our side, so far as Japanese shortage of shipping is concerned. Mr. Alexander, in his speech on March 7, gave the world a picture of the might of the Royal Navy, which in good time with the American Fleet and those gallant ships of the Southern Dominions and the British Isles already in the Pacific, will fall on Japan. Britain's sea supremacy will prove an instrument of Japan's doom.

In the air, Allied attacks on economic and industrial targets have increased. As well as attacks on shipping in the South-West Pacific area, land objectives in the territories conquered by the Japanese have received Allied attention and will do so more and more until the main islands of Japan are reached. Mining and export to Japan, of coal and various minerals of vital importance to the Japanese, have in particular been disrupted by Allied attacks on North Indo-China, one of Japan's most industriously exploited possessions. The difficulties of production and transport, hydraheaded by nature, are being multiplied endlessly by the Allied onslaught.

CONDITIONS IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES.

On the second anniversary of the surrender of the garrison of Java to overwhelming Japanese forces, the representatives of the Dutch East Indies Government, now in Australia, have issued an important statement on the conditions in the islands under Japanese occupation. As was to be expected, the statement reveals striking contradictions between the professions of Japan to be the liberator of the Colonial peoples of Asia and the practice of her soldiers, administrators and economists.

In these once rich, prosperous and well-governed islands, self-styled liberators have introduced forced labour, imposed by such brutal methods as flogging or decapitation of recalcitrants. The system of rationing which they have adopted speaks volumes for the artificial scarcity which they have induced. The price of rice, one of Java's principal exports before the war, has risen fivefold, and the daily allowance of eight ounces of rice and soya beans issued to workmen whom they employ falls far short even of the modest standards of the Indonesian manual labour. Clothing is scarce and prodigiously dear. The black market flourishes.

Prisoners of war and civilian internees are treated as badly as in Siamese or Malayan camps. Unemployment is general. Indonesians have produced no Quislings worth mentioning. They have shown a distressing aversion to their liberators and a deplorable disbelief in the blessings of co-prosperity.

Another feature of the conditions in the Dutch East Indies is the conflict between Japan's needs of raw materials and her still pressing military necessities. Though the Japanese have more than enough rubber at their disposal, they require all the petrol tin, wolfram and other strategic metals they can get from these or other acquisitions in the Southern Seas. But there is evidence that they are experiencing great difficulty in supplying and reinforcing their large garrisons in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Their mercantile marine diminishes and the problem grows ever more difficult. This explains why they are now trying to make the occupied islands "self-sufficient", not for the benefit of their Dutch or indigenous inhabitants, who must go short of food and clothing, but for their armies of occupation.

But Dutch valour and stubbornness are not easily shaken, as their unyielding resistance to German threats and cruelties in their mother country has shown. They may be relied upon to show the same spirit in the islands still occupied by Japan, and their Asiatic fellow citizens have equally shown themselves proof against both the blandishments of the first invaders and the brutalities which have followed them.

A BOMB IS DISPOSED OF.

A Captain of the Royal Engineers was motoring across the battlefield one day when a fellow hailed him and shouted that he wanted a screw driver. He was carrying something that looked like a thermos bottle under his left arm.

"What do you want it for?" enquired the Captain.

"I want to take this contraption apart", he replied, and waved the bottle.

"What is it?" enquired the Captain.

"That's what I want to find out," the man replied. "It's what the Jerries were dropping last night."

The Captain gasped. "Put that damned thing down," he shouted. "We'll bung a rifle bullet through it and see if it goes off."

"Of course it'll go off. That's what they dropped it for," answered the fellow "I want to find out how it works."

The Captain finally tossed him his tool kit, backed his truck to a safe distance and watched him for 20 minutes. To continue in the Captain's own words:—

"Squatting on the sand he held the infernal thing between his knees, plying the screw driver with the absorbed attention of a fisherman making a fly. As he detached piece after piece of the deadly mechanism he placed the pieces in his cap, which he had set beside him on the sand. He whistled continuously a cheery tune.

"Gad! This is something new. Damned interesting. Come and look! He tossed me a glance.

"Not I! Unconsciously I had been holding my breath. Now it whistled between my teeth as his remark broke the tension for a brief moment.

"Come on. We've got to see all its guts. I need you to hold it while I get out these three last confounded screws".

"My feet felt like lead as I walked over to him. Cold sweat broke from me as he unscrewed one finely-machined brass fitting after another, whistling cheerily meantime.

"My eyes were riveted to the inner core, packed with dull-grey high explosive. Each twist of his screw driver twisted my insides. Would I be quick enough to glimpse the flash of that grey core in the very moment that it blasted us to fragments? Or would it happen too fast for that?

"At last the job was done. Three screws at most three minutes more like a lifetime each screw the crisis of a lifetime.

"When he had finished I stood up and breathed again.

"Still whistling, he filled his pockets with the parts. 'I'm off to make a drawing of them" was his farewell remark.

"I never saw him again. That was not surprising, as his kind don't usually live long in war. Thank God they live at all.

"As a result of his heroism, within a few hours the Army had issued a warning against handling the thermos bomb: On no account must this bomb be handled, as a deflection of 15 degrees from the horizontal is sufficient, to cause detonation"

"Fifteen degrees! Why that thermos bomb was up-ended at least a dozen times as he was taking it apart.

"The God of Soldiers had leaned heavily toward us when he made that bomb a 'dud'."

Members of the public are requested to make a free present of any suitable old Tamil books they can spare for the perusal, in their leisure time, of our soldiers outside India.

Books so given will be handed over to the Superintendent of the State Press, who will arrange to despatch them.

PUDUKKOTTAI STATE NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU.

PROGRAMME.

LECTURE CXCI. (*Batch 1*).

1- 4-44	Municipal Office	...	6.00 p.m.
2- 4-44	Kiranur	...	7.00 „
„	Nanjur	...	7.30 „
3- 4-44	Puvarasakudi	...	7.00 „
„	Venkatakulam	...	7.30 „
4- 4-44	Perungalur	...	7.00 „
	Adanakkottai	...	7.30 „
5- 4-44	Pungudi	...	7.00 p.m.
„	Satyamangalam. .	...	7.30 „
6- 4-44	Mirattunilai	...	7.00 „
„	Arimalam	...	7.30 „
7- 4-44	Udayalippatti	...	7.00 „
„	Killukottai	...	7.30 „

LECTURE CXCII. (*Batch 2*).

8- 4-44	Nartamalai	...	7.00 p.m.
9- 4-44	„	...	7.00 „
10- 4-44	„	...	7.00 „
11- 4-44	Vengalur	...	7.00 „
„	Konapattu	...	7.30 „
12- 4-44	Panayappatti	...	7.00 p.m.
„	Rangiyam	...	7.30 „
13- 4-44	Kalamavur	...	7.00 „
„	Nallur	...	7.30 „
14- 4-44	Kudumiyamalai	...	7.00 „
„	Parambur	...	7.30 „

RECRUITING—ADVERTISEMENT—4 p. m.

1— 4—44	Vettamviduthi.
2— 4—44	Virachchilai.
4— 4—44	Perambur.
8— 4—44	Narttamalai.
9— 4—44	„
10— 4—44	„
11— 4—44	Koppanapatti.
12— 4—44	Karambakkudi
13— 4—44	Kilanilai.
14— 4—44	Pudukkottai.

Sri Brihadamba State Press, Pudukkottai. 750—2-4-44.